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NOTES
THE OTTAWA TREATY AND ITS IMPACT
ON U.S. MILITARY POLICY AND
PLANNING
ABSTRACT
Although the United States refrained from signing the Otta-
wa Treaty banning landmines in order to preserve the use of
landmines on the Korean Peninsula and America's arsenal of
anti-tank landmines, the Ottawa Treaty, even without
America's participation, creates a series of problems for the
U.S. military in terms of policy and planning. This Note ex-
amines the repercussions of the Ottawa Treaty on U.S. de-
fense strategy.
INTRODUCTION
President Clinton made a bold decision when he refused to
sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On
Their Destruction.' The international community embraced
this convention-more commonly referred to as the Ottawa
Treaty-as a ground breaking humanitarian initiative.2 How-
ever, during the Oslo meeting last September where the final
draft of the Treaty was completed, President Clinton an-
nounced from the White House on September 15, 1997 that he
1. See Philip Shenon, Clinton Still Firmly Against Land-Mine Treaty, N.Y.
TmES, Oct. 11, 1997, at A6.
2. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36
I.L.M. 1507 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Ottawa Treaty]; R.J.
Araujo, Anti-Personnel Mines and Peremptory Norms of International Law: Argu-
ment and Catalyst, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 1 (1997).
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could not in good conscience sign an agreement that would in
effect put American servicemen's lives in danger.3 The Presi-
dent stated that there were two military considerations that
prompted him to not sign the Ottawa Treaty.4 First, President
Clinton specifically mentioned that signing the Ottawa Treaty
would mean that the United States would have to remove its
anti-personnel landmines from the Demilitarized Zone. along
the North and South Korean border, thus eliminating a key
part of America's defense in that region. This move would
severely undermine U.S. and South Korean forces' ability to
deter the numerically superior North Korean army from
launching a pre-emptive attack.5 Second, President Clinton
refused to sign the Treaty because the wording of the Treaty
would have banned U.S. anti-tank mines in addition to all U.S.
anti-personnel mines. Currently, the U.S. military expects that
any conflict it may face in the near future will likely entail an
enemy armored assault.6
Although the U.S. negotiation team urged the parties at
the convention in Oslo to exempt U.S. landmines in Korea and
to re-word the Treaty to exempt U.S. anti-tank mines as well,
their efforts failed and the final draft remained objectionable to
President Clinton.7 The United States hoped to preserve its
3. See President William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President on Land-
Mines, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1356-59 (Sept. 22, 1997).
4. See Id.
5. See Id.; The Center for Security Policy, Nobel Committee Notwithstanding,
An Effective, Global Ban On Anti-Personnel Landmines Remains An Infeasible
Unreality, No. 97-P 151 (visited Oct. 10, 1997) <http'J/www.security-poli-
cy.orgfpapersl97-p136.html>; Jacob Heilbrunn, Minefield of Dreams: Landmines are
Bad. So is Banning Them., NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 4. The current Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Henry H. Shelton, U.S. Army, during his
confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee's Readiness
Subcommittee, commented on the importance of an exception for Korea:
Anti-personnel landmines are integral to the defense of the Republic of
Korea, and as long as there is risk of aggression in Korea and we do not
have suitable alternatives fielded, we must ensure the best protection of
our forces and those of our allies . . . [Blecause of the unique situation
on the Korean Peninsula, non-self-destructing (NSD) or "dumb" mines are
essential to our commanders in the Republic of Korea as long as there is
a risk of aggression and we have no fielded suitable alternatives to the
NSD mines used in Korea.
The Center for Security Policy, New Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Draws
Line in the Sand: No Exception, No Military 'Chop' on Landmine Ban, No. 97-D
136 (visited Sept. 16, 1997) <http://Ivww.security-policy.org/papers/97-p136.html>.
6. See Clinton, supra note 3.
7. See White House Press Briefing by Robert Bell, Senior Director for De-
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right to keep its landmines-both anti-personnel and anti-tank
versions-not only on the Korean Peninsula but also at U.S.
military installations around the globe by refusing to sign the
Treaty. This hope, however, may not be realized. Currently, at
least one U.S. ally is interpreting the Ottawa Treaty to mean
that U.S. landmines presently stored in their territory must be
removed in accordance with the Treaty provisions.8 Moreover,
another potential conflict exists as some U.S. allies may inter-
pret the Ottawa Treaty to make it illegal for their militaries
from participating alongside the United States in multi-lateral
operations.
This Note examines the various ramifications the Ottawa
Treaty has on U.S. defense strategy and its relations with her
allies. Part I looks at the history of the landmine, its current
use as a military weapon, and the effect landmines have had
on civilian populations. Part II reviews the history of the inter-
national movement to ban landmines. Part III will examine
the Ottawa Treaty and its effect on the U.S. pre-positioned
stockpiles stored in allied territories. Part IV focuses on the
issue of U.S. anti-tank mines and why they too are illegal
under the Ottawa Treaty. Part V examines the reason why the
United States has placed such heavy emphasis on the need to
protect its landmine inventory and why the landmine is, for
now, an essential part of America's overall military strategy.
Finally, Part VI shows how the Ottawa Treaty will affect how
the United States and her allies operate together during multi-
lateral operations should U.S. allies who are party to the Otta-
wa Treaty favor a narrow interpretation of the Treaty text. In
addition, Part VI looks at how the Ottawa Treaty will influ-
ence the decision of the United States to support the Interna-
tional Criminal Court.
fense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council, Sept. 19, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 14463239.
8. See Nils-Inge Kruhaug, U.S. has pre-positioned mines in Norway,
DAGBLADET, Sept. 12, 1997, at 19. I note that DAGBLADET references used herein
are derived from U.S. State Department translations and/or summaries on file
with the Weapons Technology Control Division, J-5, Joint Chiefs of Staff (unpub-
lished translations on file with the author).
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PART I. WHAT IS A LANDMINE AND How is IT USED?
The Ottawa Treaty defines a landmine as "a munition
designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other
surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or
contact of a person or vehicle."9 These devices were first intro-
duced during World War I though it was not until the Second
World War that the United States recognized the value of
landmine use when operating in a situation where U.S. forces
are out-gunned by enemy forces."
For the Allies, North Africa was the crucible in which the
principles and techniques of large-scale mine warfare in mo-
bile, mechanized operations were tested and refined." Both
Allied and Axis forces utilized mines in great numbers as a
countermeasure against superior forces. 2 As a result of U.S.
and allied experience, the landmine was viewed as an efficient
weapon against an armored attack."3
Since World War II landmine technology and use has
advanced, although the United States has consistently followed
the basic role of the landmine as a defensive military tool. U.S.
Army Field Manual 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, lists
the uses of mines as to: first, "produce a specific effect on ene-
my maneuver, thereby creating a vulnerability that can be
exploited by friendly forces;" second, to "cause the enemy to
piecemeal his forces;" third, "interfere with enemy command
and control;" fourth, "inflict damage to enemy personnel and
equipment;" and finally to "protect friendly forces from enemy
maneuver.
"14
These roles as outlined in the Army Field Manual were
enhanced by new technologies such as the development of the
"family of scatterable mines (FASCAM)," landmines that can
be delivered by air or artillery. 5 FASCAM technology has giv-
en U.S. military commanders the ability to order mines de-
ployed during the course of a battle to satisfy any of the uses
9. Ottawa Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 2(2).
10. Thomas Hawkins, Congressional Research Service, Report 96-362F,
Landmines: Basic Facts and Congressional Concerns (1996).
11. See MIKE CROLL, THE HISTORY OF LANDMINEs 66 (1998).
12. Id. at 57.
13. See Hawkins, supra note 10, at 4.
14. Id. (quoting Headquarters, U.S. Dep't Army, MINE/COUNTERIMINE OPERA-
TIONS, FM20-32 84-85 (1966)).
15. Hawkins, supra note 10, at 6.
[Vol. XXV:J
THE OTTAWA TREATY
listed in the Army Field Manual. 6
In addition to the purely defensive role as envisioned by
the United States, a second role for landmines has emerged
since World War II. That is, the use of landmines against non-
combatants in which case landmines are used to intimidate the
local population by denying to them the use of commerce.'7
For example, landmines might be placed around a village's
water supply or on roads leading to markets. 8 During the
Vietnam War, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were able
to pursue a dual objective of intimidating the local populations
and killing U.S. military personnel. 9
Use of landmines in this manner has resulted in the indis-
criminate killing and maiming of millions of civilians since a
landmine cannot tell the difference between a combatant and a
non-combatant." The International Campaign to Ban
Landmines estimates that approximately 26,000 people are
killed or maimed each year by anti-personnel landmines."
Furthermore, the killing does not stop when an armed conflict
ends. The use of landmines by irregular forces like the Viet
Cong means the landmines are usually left behind in un-
marked minefields with no authority existing that takes the
responsibility of picking the landmines up.22 As a result it is
estimated that there are 110 million landmines buried in sixty-
four countries.'
There currently exist two approaches to solving the prob-
lems resulting from this second role of landmines. The first,
favored by the United States, seeks to use technology to elimi-
nate the potential of landmines to continue to kill or maim
long after the fighting is over. The second approach, as envis-
aged in the Ottawa Treaty, seeks a total ban on all
landmines.'
16. See id.
17. Id. See also CROLL, supra note 11, at 107-08.
18. See Hawkins, supra note 10, at 9-10; THE ARMS PROJECT, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, A DEADLY LEGACY 23 (1993).
19. See CROLL, supra note 11, at 9; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 18.
20. See Araujo, supra note 2, at 2.
21. See International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Facts about Landmines
(visited Oct. 27, 1997) <http//www.vvaf.org/library/index.html>.
22. See Araujo, supra note 2, at 2.
23. See Sen. Patrick Leahy, The Scourge of Landmines (visited Oct. 27, 1997)
<http'J/www.senate.gov/membervt/leahy/generaIllandmine.htm>
24. See Hawkins, supra note 10, at 16.
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PARTII. Two APPROACHES TO SOLVING THE
INTERNATIONAL LANDMINE PROBLEM
Both approaches to solving the landmine problem are
embodied in two separate treaties. The first approach is repre-
sented by The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate
Effects (CCW)Y. Specifically, Protocol II of the CCW address-
es the problem of landmines. 6 Following close to U.S. mili-
tary doctrine, the Protocol does not require the complete ban of
landmines but rather places a number of restrictions on the
use of landmines in order to limit the danger landmines pres-
ent to non-combatants. As a result, the CCW reasons that
landmines can be used responsibly while still serving a limited,
tactical role on the battlefield." For example, the Protocol re-
quires all mines delivered by air or artillery to be equipped
with self-destruct devices, the establishment of an effective
compliance mechanism, and the prohibition of employing
mines attached to food, water, toys, and casualties."
Protocol II has been criticized by organizations, such as
the International Committee for the Red Cross and the Human
Rights Watch, because it places greater emphasis on military
considerations rather than humanitarian concerns.29 The Red
Cross represents the view that the only way to solve the
landmine problem is to ban all landmines." The International
Committee to Ban Land Mines has championed this move-
25. See Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Con-
ventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 I.L.M. 1523 (1980)
(entered into force Dec. 2, 1983) thereinafter CCWJ. The CCW was signed by the
United States on April 8, 1982, submitted to the Senate on May 12, 1994, given
advice and consent by the Senate and ratified by the United States on March 24,
1995, and entered into force for the U.S. on September 24, 1995.
26. See Mines Protocol to the CCW, as amended, May 3, 1996, Final Docu-
ment of the Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, Conf. Doc.
CCW/CONF.I16, 35 I.L.M. 1206 (1996).
27. See Hawkins, supra note 10, at 14-15.
28. Id. For a more comprehensive discussion of the history of Protocol II and
an analysis of its recent changes, see Michael J. Mathesona, The Revision of the
Mines Protocol, 91 AM. J. INTL L. 158 (1997).
29. See Paul J. Lightfoot, Note, The Landmine Review Conference: Will the
Revised Landmine Protocol Protect Civilians?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1526, 1558
(1995).
30. See Hawkins, supra note 10, at 16.
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ment. Formed six years ago in Washington, D.C., this group is
largely responsible for starting the Ottawa process moving last
January. Then, only 40 states met in Oslo.3 Throughout
1997, the movement gained momentum thanks largely to the
work of Princess Diana and Canadian Prime Minister Lloyd
Axworthy" The movement culminated with the final drafting
of the Ottawa Treaty in September 1997. Over 100 states,
including the United States, attended that meeting.33
Despite the large turnout at the Oslo meeting, the Ottawa
Treaty lacks the support of key states, namely the United
States, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iraq, and
Iran.34 With the exception of the United States, these states
rely heavily on landmines mostly to defend their borders. To-
gether these states represent over half the world's mine pro-
ducers." As a result, the Ottawa Treaty, while expansive in
breadth, will not achieve its intended goal. The United States
has no desire to sign the Treaty in its current form while
states like China, Iran, and Iraq refuse to give up their
landmines. Nevertheless, despite President Clinton's decision
to not sign the Ottawa Treaty, U.S. landmines pre-positioned
in allied territory abroad may still be in jeopardy of removal
from exactly where they are needed the most.
PART III. CAN THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO STORE
ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES ON THE TERRITORY
OF ALLIES WHO ARE PARTIES TO THE OTTAWA
TREATY?
The decision of the United States to refrain from signing
the Ottawa Treaty creates many real and potential conflicts
with her allies. One such conflict concerns the storage of U.S.
landmines positioned in allied territories abroad.
The concept of pre-positioning stockpiles of weapons and
equipment is a cornerstone of current U.S. defense strategy."
31. See Heilbrunn, supra note 5.
32. See Bell, supra note 7.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Lt. Col. Mike W. Thumm, USMC, Information on U.S. Anti-Personnel
Landmine (APL) Storage in Europe, Jan. 7, 1998 (on file with the author) (provid-
ing information for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
19991
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Since the early 1980's, the United States has placed a number
of pre-positioned equipment and weapon stockpiles in various
locations throughout the world. Some of these stockpiles are
contained on ships while others are located in storage facilities
located in territories of U.S. allies." By pre-positioning equip-
ment closer to potential hotspots around the globe, the United
States need only be concerned with getting individual soldiers
and Marines to the battlefield-a far less arduous task than
moving personnel as well as equipment. Thus, the pre-position-
ing concept allows for rapid deployment of U.S. forces which in
turn acts as a deterrent for would be aggressors who know
that the United States has the capability to place a sizable
force in an area of hostilities in a relatively short period of
time. A mixed inventory of landmines is kept at each location
to match the different scenarios U.S. forces might encounter. 8
For example, Norway, a signatory to the Ottawa Treaty, is
home to a U.S. pre-positioned stockpile of weapons, munitions,
and other supplies for the Army and Marine Corps. 9 The
landmines stored in Norway consist primarily of ADAM (Area
Denial Artillery Munition) artillery rounds.0 The ADAM is a
cargo-like projectile fired from the M198 howitzer.4' The AD-
AM rounds as well as the other pre-positioned equipment are
designated for the use of the Norway air-landed Marine Expe-
Affairs to use in preparation for bilateral consultations with NATO countries that
provide storage for U.S. landmines).
37. Id.; Memorandum from the J-5 Staff of the Weapons Technology Control
Division, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Nov. 6, 1997) (unpublished memoran-
dum on file with the author). As part of the Maritime Pre-positioning Program,
the U.S. Army, Navy and Marine Corps store both anti-personnel and anti-tank
mines aboard PREPO (pre-positioned) ships that remain either afloat in the waters
surrounding the Persian Gulf or are docked at their homeport, Diego Garcia, a
British Island in the Indian Ocean.
38. See Hawkins, supra note 10, at 6-7. As a result of deliberate contingency
planning, specific landmine types are stockpiled in various locations abroad. U.S.
military planners anticipate the requirements of various units for these munitions
based on possible scenarios. Some landmines are to be used in close proximity of
enemy forces (GEMESS, MOPMS, Volcano), while others are delivered by fixed-
and rotor-winged aircraft (Gator and Volcano) at further distances to influence
deep into the battle space. The ADAM munition is delivered by artillery and is
used at medium ranges.
39. See Memorandum of Understanding Governing Pre-stockage and Reinforce-
ment of Norway, Jan. 16, 1981, U.S.-Nor., 32 U.S.T. 4539, 4539-40.
40. See infra note 53.
41. See Hawkins, supra note 10, at 7.
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ditionary Brigade.42 Along with the Norwegian armed forces,
this Marine Corps Brigade is tasked with defending Norway
and NATO's northern flank.43
The question as to whether these landmines are to be
removed under the provisions of the Ottawa Treaty is yet to be
determined. Specifically, the United States has four concerns:
1) whether there is a destruction requirement for anti-person-
nel landmines owned by the United States but stored on the
territory of a State Party;" 2) whether allowing a foreign-
owned stockpile to exist on a State Party's territory would fall
under the provision in paragraph 1(c) of the Treaty which
prohibits parties from giving assistance, encouragement or
inducement to countries using landmines;4' 3) whether trans-
fer requirements would preclude logistical cooperation regard-
ing movement of munitions involving anti-personnel landmines
to either areas of combat or other operations such as the ongo-
ing United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) peacekeeping operations in Bosnia;46 4) regard-
ing the storage of pre-positioned landmines aboard ships, may
these ships transit the territory, including the ports, of State
Party's without violating the Treaty?" The answers to these
questions depend on the interpretation of the language of para-
graph 1(c) as well as the interpretation of the words "jurisdic-
tion" or "control" as written in Articles 4 and 5 of the Trea-
ty.4
8
Norway's stated interpretation of the Treaty does not bode
well for U.S. security interests. The Norwegian government
publicly debated this issue during the Oslo negotiations last
September.49 Norwegian State Secretary, and Norway's chief
42. Id.
43. See JOHN KEEGAN & ANDREW WHEATCROFT, ZONES OF CONFLICT. AN AT-
LAS OF FUTURE WARS 10-11 (1986).
44. See Ottawa Treaty supra note 2, art. 1(2).
45. Id. arts. 1(c), 4.
46. Id. For example, will the Treaty prevent the United States from shipping
mines through Turkey, Hungary, and/or Austria to Bosnia?
47. Id.
48. See Delegation of the United States, Maintaining Mutual Security Com-
mitments Under A Non-Universal APL Ban Treaty (Sept. 10, 1997) (working paper
for U.S. delegation to the Oslo Convention on file with the Office of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Weapons and Technology Control Division).
49. See Kruhaug, supra note 8; Nils-Inge Kruhaug, Here are the U.S. mines,
DAGBLADET, Sept. 13, 1997, at 22-23.
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negotiator at the Oslo convention, Jan Egeland, revealed on
September 12, 1997, that he had only recently become aware
that U.S. landmines were still being stored in Norwegian terri-
tory." This was an unexpected statement since the Norwe-
gian government unilaterally banned the stockpiling of
landmines in November 1995. Nevertheless, the issue of U.S.
pre-positioned stockpiles containing landmines was apparently
never settled by the Norwegian Defense Ministry and the U.S.
Department of State. Norwegian working groups that were
putting together Norway's position on the international prob-
lem of landmines sent a letter to the U.S. embassy in January
1996 asking for information on whether the United States
stored landmines in the pre-positioned stockpiles. They never
received a response.5' Norway's Defense Minister, Jorgen
Kosmo, had said that "[t]he Norwegian ban on pre-positioning
of personnel mines applies first and foremost to the Norwegian
armed forces, not to the armed forces of other countries."52
Regardless, on September 12, 1997 Egeland announced
Norway's official position on the storage of U.S. landmines on
Norwegian territory, stating, "[t]he American mines that are
pre-positioned in Norway must be taken back to the United
States. We have destroyed our own mines, but naturally we
can't do the same with the American ones. We must therefore
negotiate about when and how the American mines be sent
back."" Presently, no decision has yet been reached between
the two governments as to the status of U.S. landmines in
Norway, although there is no indication that Norway has
backed down on its desire to rid their country of U.S.
landmines.
This interpretation of the Ottawa Treaty by the Norwegian
government sets a dangerous precedent which may affect U.S.
stockpiles in other allied territories, namely, Japan, Germany,
Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, all of whom are signato-
ries to the Ottawa Treaty.' Presently, the United States is
50. See Kruhaug, supra note 8.
51. See Never Got A Response, DAGBLADET, Sept. 13, 1997.
52. Kruhaug, supra note 8.
53. Arne Foss, All mines will be removed, DAGBLADET, Sept. 12, 1997, at 12.
54. See Unclassified Memorandum from Cpt. Maria Gervais, U.S. Army, J-5,
Strategic Plans and Policy, Weapons Technology Control Branch (Technology Trans-
fer Branch) to author (Nov. 19, 1997) (unpublished memorandum on file with au-
thor)[hereinafter Gervais Memo]. The following provides a summary of landmine
192 [Vol. XXV: I
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negotiating with her allies who are State Parties to the Ottawa
Treaty and who are contemplating removal of U.S. landmines
under Article 1(c) of the Treaty, though the results of these
discussions are classified.55
The total effect of the removal of U.S. mines from pre-
positioned stockpiles is a serious limitation of the ability of the
United States to respond rapidly and effectively to military
conflicts abroad. The United States is concerned that until it
can develop an alternative system to replace anti-personnel
and anti-tank landmines, the ability to slow down an enemy
advance in an armor-intensive conflict is severely hindered.
President Clinton expressed this concern on September 17,
1997 when he announced to the world that the United States
could not support the Ottawa Treaty as it was written at the
conclusion of the Oslo meeting:
First, we needed an adequate transition period to phase out
the anti-personnel mines we now use to protect our troops,
giving us time to devise alternative technologies. Second, we
needed to preserve the anti-tank mines we rely upon to slow
down an enemy's... armored assault against our troops, the
kind of attack our adversaries would be most likely to
launch.6
stockpiles and their locations in those countries that have signed the Ottawa Trea-
ty as of Oct. 14, 1997:
Type of Landmine Location
M68 Practice, M74 GEMSS (Ground-Emplaced Mine- Germany
Scattering System), ADAM, M131 MOPMS, Volcano
ADAM, Volcano, M-16, Gator Japan
M74 GEMSS, ADAM, M131 MOPMS, Gator Italy
M692E1, ADAM Norway
M16, ADAM, Gator Spain
ADAM, MOPMS, GEMMS, Volcano, Gator United Kingdom
(Diego Garcia)
55. Telephone Interview with Cpt. Maria Gervais, U.S. Army, J-5, Strategic
Plans and Policy, Weapons Technology Control Branch (Technology Transfer
Branch) (Jan. 14, 1998).
56. Clinton, supra note 3.
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Of course, neither concern was satisfied by the final draft of
the Ottawa Treaty and so the United States refrained from
signing the Treaty in December 1997.
PART IV. U.S. ANTI-TANK LANDMINES WOULD ALSO BE
BANNED UNDER THE OTTAWA TREATY
In addition to addressing the issue of finding an alterna-
tive to the landmine, the President's remarks highlighted an-
other interpretation problem the United States has with the
Ottawa Treaty. The way in which the Treaty is worded not
only bans State Parties from producing, acquiring, stockpiling,
retaining or transferring to anyone anti-personnel landmines,
it also bans, indirectly, U.S. anti-tank mines, while protecting
those anti-tank landmines manufactured and used by Europe-
an countries. 7
The purpose of an anti-tank mine is to destroy or slow
down an enemy tank or armored personnel carrier.58 Almost
all anti-tank mines contain an anti-handling device that is
intended to prevent enemy personnel from approaching the
anti-tank mine in order to disarm the mine.59 An enemy sol-
dier cannot explode the anti-tank mine alone, since anti-tank
mines can only explode when thousands of pounds of pressure
are exerted on it or when it detects "a large magnetic force.""
The difference between U.S. anti-tank mines and those
used by America's European allies, is that U.S. anti-tank
mines use anti-handling devices which are located next to the
anti-tank mine and are detonated when enemy soldiers acti-
vate the device touching a series of tripwires which surround
the anti-tank mine.6 European anti-handling devices, on the
other hand, are located on top, beneath, or are attached direct-
ly to the anti-tank mine. Combat engineers can disarm these
anti-handling devices, except that the U.S. anti-handling devic-
es take approximately 20 minutes to disarm while other anti-
57. See Bell, supra note 7; "I ... believe that an accurate definition of anti-
personnel (AP) landmines is essential to prevent the banning of mixed munitions
under the treaty." The Center for Security Policy, supra note 5 (comments of Gen.
Henry H. Shelton, U.S. CJCS).
58. See CROLL, supra note 11, at 29.
59. See MODERN U.S. ARMY 151 (Richard O'Neil ed., 1986).
60. Id. at 151.
61. See Bell, supra note 7.
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handling devices take only 2 to 3 minutes to disarm.62
The anti-tank landmine is a vital part of the U.S. arse-
nal.6 ' The mine is used to protect U.S. forces in both a defen-
sive and offensive posture. It gives military commanders pre-
cious time to carry out their mission by slowing down enemy
forces while at the same time it limits exposure of U.S. mili-
tary personnel to enemy fire since anti-tank mines like the
ADAM can be delivered by air or artillery:
Imagine the Gulf War. Imagine General McCaffrey's 24th
Mechanized Division with a left hook. He's out there with no
protection on his flanks, maneuvering. And you see an enemy
force coming in on his flank. You pick up the phone, call in
an air strike. The aircraft comes over and drops this canister
in front of the Republican Guard unit that's threatening his
flank and puts down this field of anti-tank mines with their
protective munitions as part of it. That's the concept of em-
ployment here.'
The precious minutes that a military commander can rely on
by using anti-tank mines clearly make the anti-tank mine a
tremendously valuable weapon.
The Ottawa Treaty, however, exempts only those anti-tank
mines with anti-handling devices that are a part of, linked to,
attached to or placed under the mine, thereby exempting Euro-
pean anti-tank mines from the ban but not U.S. anti-tank
mines." Robert Bell, Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control with the
National Security Council, described the conflict the United
States had with the definition of anti-handling device used by
the drafters of the Ottawa Treaty:
62. Id.
63. See Center for Security Policy, supra note 5. Gen. Henry H. Shelton
states:
I firmly believe that our anti-tank and anti-vehicle munitions-which are
mixed systems composed entirely of smart anti-tank and anti-personnel
mines that self-destruct or deactivate in a relatively short period of
time-are vital to the protection of our men and women in the
field .... The military utility of these systems is, in my mind, unques-
tionable.
Id.
64. Bell, supra note 7.
65. See Ottawa Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2(3).
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Now, the Treaty exemption that we found on the table when
we got to Oslo did not extend quite that far to capture the
engineering design of our systems. And we proposed two
words, two simple words added to that exemption.66
The words were "or near," so that a device placed near the
anti-tank mine to protect it was exempted in the same way
that the devices for our allies are exempted, would fix that
problem. And, unfortunately, as the President said, the con-
ference wouldn't agree. And he could not, as he emphasized,
allow our principal antitank munitions to be stripped from
our inventory."
Although the United States could switch to using the type
of mine covered in the Treaty, such a move would be time-
consuming and costly.68 Consequently, if the United States
signs the Ottawa Treaty its inventory of anti-tank mines would
effectively be banned according to the wording of the Treaty
while all other anti-tank mines devices would be exempted.
PART V. THE EFFECT OF THE OTTAWA TREATY ON U.S.
DEFENSE STRATEGY
If U.S. allies require that U.S. pre-positioned stockpiles of
both anti-personnel and anti-tank mines are to be removed
from their territories, the decision of the United States to not
sign the Ottawa Treaty will be worthless. The ability of the
United States to utilize such systems will be severely curtailed
until an alternative system is developed. Of course the United
States will retain its inventory of anti-personnel and anti-tank
mines. However, they will not be where U.S. forces need them
the most-stored close to the battlefield.
In September 1996, President Clinton ordered the U.S.
Defense Department to develop an alternative to the landmine
within nine years of the time the Oslo Convention was con-
cluded.69 In October 1997, however, the Clinton administra-
66. See Ottawa Treaty, supra note 2. Article 2(3) states that: "'Anti-handling
device' means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to,
attached to, or placed under a mine and which activates when an attempt is made
to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine." Id.
67. Bell, supra note 7.
68. See id.
69. OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECY OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO THE U.S. SECY OF
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tion dropped its plans to eliminate all anti-personnel
landmines by 2006. Administration officials said the reason
was that no alternative weapon system existed at present that
could feasibly be developed, tested, and deployed by the
President's original deadline."v The President shifted this poli-
cy in May of 1998 by pledging to sign the Ottawa Treaty by
the year 2006-but only if the Pentagon can come up with an
alternative.' As a result, this announcement is more symbolic
than a true commitment to sign the present Treaty. 2
Before an alternative to the landmine can be adopted the
U.S. military may be vulnerable if its pre-positioned stockpiles
of landmines are removed. Current U.S. military strategy is
shaped primarily by the Clinton Administration's requirement
that the United States have the capability to fight and win two
Major Regional Conflicts such as a second Korean or Persian
Gulf War. 3 As a result of recent and ongoing defense-budget
cuts, achieving the President's stated goal means the United
States must rely on new strategies as a consequence of a
shrinkage in force size and slower development and procure-
ment of new weapon systems.'4 Projecting effective U.S. pow-
er abroad given today's limited resources means the United
States must have a rapid deployment capability and increased
lethality of its weaponry. 5
The combination of the pre-positioning stockpile concept
with anti-personnel and anti-tank mines is intended to achieve
the requirement for a rapid deployment capability as well as
DEFENSE ON THE STATUS OF THE U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
U.S. POLICY ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES 4 (1997).
70. See Dana Priest, Administration Drops Plans to Find Substitutes for Anti-
personnel Mine; Advocates of International Ban Say Clinton Abandoning Pledge,
WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1997, at A28. One example of an idea that had been consid-
ered was the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. The High Altitude Endurance
(HAE) platform would have carried a 2,000-pound sensors package to 65,000 feet
and loiter for more than 24 hours. The HAE system would have surveyed a desig-
nated area to detect moving vehicles and personnel. Another unmanned vehicle,
operating at 25,000 feet with an endurance of 24 hours, would be used as the
weapons platform, raining precision-guided, gravity-driven bombs onto the target.
See OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECY OF DEFENSE, supra, note 69, at 16.
71. See Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Agrees to Land Mine Ban, But Not Yet,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1998, at A3.
72. Id.
73. See Hawkins, supra note 10, at 6.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 7.
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increased lethality. The value of this component of the U.S.
military strategy was tested during the Persian Gulf War, dur-
ing the early days of Operation Desert Shield immediately
following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and, later, during Allied
offensive which was part of Operation Desert Storm.
As soon as Iraqi forces threatened the integrity of the
Saudi oil fields U.S. forces were rapidly deployed to the Middle
East to marry up to their equipment pre-positioned on ships
located in the Indian Ocean.76 Although the United States
was able to build a sizable force within only a few weeks of
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the early days following the invasion
were a time of concern for the United States and its allies.
Iraq's presence in Kuwait threatened the Saudi oil fields.7" To
help deter such a move by Iraqi forces, the United States had
sent the 82nd Airborne Division and the Marine 7th Expedi-
tionary Brigade to Saudi Arabia only two days after the inva-
sion. Although these forces are both highly capable and lethal
fighting units, even they could not stop an Iraqi armored as-
sault since the United States does not at present have a weap-
on that can be carried by light infantry to stop an armored
advance.78 That left the 82nd Airborne and Marines with only
one option: the use of anti-tank landmines to slow the attack
until heavier U.S. and allied forces could arrive with heavy
tanks and attack helicopters and fighter-bombers.
Moreover, denying the use of landmines to U.S. forces
prevents military commanders from being able to shape the
battlefield, force the enemy to maneuver to an unsatisfactory
position, and mass power for decisive engagement.79 The com-
bination of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines serve to give
U.S. forces the necessary combination of landmines to delay,
turn, fix, or block enemy forces as necessary. The enemy thus
can be forced into an area where U.S. forces can engage them
with more efficient and accurate weapon systems."0 In addi-
76. See ROBERT MOSKIN, THE U.S. MARINES STORY 771-72 (1992).
77. See id.
78. Id. at 6. The 82nd Airborne Division's only effective anti-tank weapon
during their initial deployment in the Gulf was the aging Sheridan tank. Since
then the 82nd was supposed to receive the Armored Gun System. This system
program was cancelled in 1996. Other alternative anti-tank weapons are still being
developed.
79. See Gervais Memo, supra note 54.
80. See Hawkins, supra note 10, at 4.
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tion to the actual use of these weapons, their removal will
deny military commanders the ability to train with essential
weapon systems during combined and multilateral military
exercises."' Being denied this ability is all the more crucial
since America's likely adversaries-Russia, China, Iraq, Iran,
North Korea, India-have not signed the Ottawa Treaty and
therefore their military commanders will continue to utilize the
landmine in their war planning.
Thus, the United States is vigorously negotiating with its
allies to keep our landmines in the pre-positioned stockpiles.
Until new technologies emerge which can replace the landmine
as a frontline weapon to be used against a likely armored as-
sault, the U.S. military must rely on the landmine as the best
tool to accomplish its mission.
PART VI. WHETHER THE OTTAWA TREATY WILL DENY THE
USE OF LANDMINES DURING COALITION
OPERATIONS
A third issue that concerns U.S. military officials is wheth-
er the Ottawa Treaty will prevent America's allies who are
parties to the Ottawa Treaty from participating with the Unit-
ed States in multilateral operations. In the 1990s, the United
States has participated in a number of multi-national opera-
tions. The United States operated in a coalition environment
during the Persian Gulf War, Somalia, and currently in the
Balkans. More missions like these are likely to be encountered
by the United States and her allies in the near future.82 Dur-
ing the Oslo negotiations the question arose as to whether the
Ottawa Treaty will affect the ability of signatory States and
non-signatory States from training or operating together dur-
ing coalition operations. In addition, there is debate within the
U.S. military as to whether the issue of Command and Control
of coalition forces is impacted by the absence of the United
States as a signatory to the Treaty.83
81. See Gervais Memo, supra note 54.
82. See Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, The SJA in Future Operations, MARINE CORPS
GAZETTE, Feb. 15, 1996, at 16. General Zinni is currently the Commanding Officer
of the U.S. Central Command, which exercises military jurisdiction over operations
in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia.
83. See Unclassified Memorandum from Maj. William K. Lietzau, USMC, Of-
fice of the Legal Counsel, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Head of
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For example, during coalition military operations, coalition
officers-that is non-U.S. commanders-may be in the position
to command U.S. troops. As a result, these commanders will be
in a position to authorize the use of U.S. anti-tank mines, the
kind of landmine banned under the Ottawa Treaty. The ques-
tion then is if the coalition commander orders U.S. forces to
use these landmines, might such action violate article 1(c) of
the Ottawa Treaty that prohibits the assisting, encouraging or
inducement of anyone to use anti-personnel landmines? Once
again the Ottawa Treaty leaves room for an interpretation that
may have a negative impact on multinational operations.'
Article 1, paragraph a, of the Ottawa Treaty specifically
bans the "use" of anti-personnel landmines." The United
States had defined the word "use" as meaning emplacement,
that is the physical placement of an anti-personnel landmine
on the ground. Other countries that have signed the Ottawa
Treaty differ in their interpretation of the word "use." Specifi-
cally, comments made by Canada during the Treaty negotia-
tions in Oslo, suggested that if a signatory receives a tactical
benefit from a landmine then that would violate Article 1 re-
gardless of who placed the mines.8" Under this view, U.S.
coalition partners who are Parties to the Ottawa Treaty would
have to clear any U.S. mines that may exist on ground that
they control. Obviously, this interpretation raises vital ques-
tions as to whether U.S. forces could effectively-and legal-
ly-fight alongside Canadian forces since U.S. tactics would be
illegal under the Ottawa Treaty and thus Canada could not
support such activities.
Fortunately, this potential conflict with Canada was re-
solved before the final draft was open for signatures in Decem-
ber 1997. The Canadian government added a note of under-
standing to the Treaty.87 The note explained that, in essence,
Canada would not interpret the Ottawa Treaty so that the
mere participation of Canadian forces in operations with the
U.S. military would not be construed as "assistance, encourage-
the U.S. Delegation to the Sept. 1997 meeting in Oslo, Norway, discussing
interoperability concerns regarding U.S. military doctrine and the Ottawa Treaty
(Sept. 12, 1997) (unpublished memorandum on file with the author).
84. Id.
85. See Ottawa Treaty, supra note 2, art. 1(1)(a).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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ment, or inducement," as stated in article 1, paragraph 1(c).8s
No other State Party has announced an interpretation of the
Treaty similar to Canada's original position.89 Nevertheless
the potential exists for such an interpretation should a State
Party so desire. If so, the current rules governing coalition
forces will have to be re-evaluated.
Using landmines during coalition operations may make
U.S. military commanders and their forces liable for using
landmines in countries where the Ottawa Treaty prohibits
such use. Article 9 requires State Parties to create national
implementation measures to sanction the use of landmines.9
Italy and Spain are currently considering such legislation, a
development the United States is carefully observing.9 Of
course this issue is tied up with the question of whether to
remove U.S. landmines from stockpiles. If the United States
can keep its mines in the stockpiles the host countries will
have to carve out an exception for the U.S. mines.92
On the other hand, there have been discussions in the
context of the proposed International Criminal Court (ICC) in
which several countries have suggested that landmine use is a
crime of universal jurisdiction and should be prosecutable by
an international court.93 The ICC is to be established by an
international treaty to be used as a mechanism to prosecute
war criminals, that is, individuals accused of committing
crimes against humanity such as genocide. 4 While recogniz-
ing the noble motives driving the ICC movement, U.S. officials
are wary that the ICC may be used as a weapon by less power-
ful nations to hinder legitimate U.S. military operations.95
David Scheffer, President Clinton's adviser on war crimes,
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Letter from Maj. William K. Lietzau, USMC, Legal Counsel to Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Cpt. Maria Gervais, U.S. Army, J-5 Weapons
Technology Control Division (Jan. 15, 1997) (unpublished letter on file with au-
thor).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Barbara Crossette, World Criminal Court Having a Painful Birth, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at A10.
95. See Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Condemns Pentagon Lob-
bying on the International Criminal Court (visited Apr. 18, 1998)
<http:J/www.hrw.org/hrw/press98/aprl/pntg-l.htm>.
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explained the U.S position:
Our military forces are often called upon to engage overseas
in conflict situations, for purposes of humanitarian interven-
tion, to rescue hostages, to bring out American citizens from
threatening environments, to deal with terrorists. We have to
be extremely careful that this proposal does not limit the
capacity of our armed forces to legitimately operate interna-
tionally. We have to be careful that it does not open up op-
portunities for endless frivolous complaints to be lodged
against the United States as a global military power.96
The Pentagon has appealed to non-U.S. military officials to
help ensure that the ICC jurisdiction does not interfere with a
state's ability to wage war. In March 1998, the Department of
Defense sent a letter to military attaches based at embassies
in Washington and Brussels urging them to monitor discus-
sions on the proposed court. 7
Specifically the United States is concerned that the defini-
tions of crimes and the elements of proof for those crimes that
may be prosecuted at the ICC are too vague." At present the
current draft statute would allow ICC judges to decide on
many of these details.99 In addition, the rules of procedure
and evidence to be used by the ICC are to be authored by the
court itself.'00 The United States is seeking to annex the stat-
ute and to provide a provision that outlines specific rules of
procedure and evidence.'
The source of U.S. concern is that an ICC prosecutor may
be politically motivated to affect U.S. military operations by
holding U.S. service members liable for violations of various
treaties, namely the Ottawa Treaty.0 2 Since the United
States is not a party to the Ottawa Treaty individual service
members will not be held liable for violating the Treaty. 3
They may, however, be liable for violating the law of a State
96. See Crossette, supra note 94 (quoting statement of David Scheffer).
97. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 95.
98. Id.
99. See Staff Judge Advocate, May 1998 Newsletter, ICC UPDATE, (visited May
27, 1998) <http'//www.hqi.usmc.miI/jaweb/hqmcja.nsf>.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 95.
103. See Lietzau Memo, supra note 83.
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Party who has incorporated the Ottawa Treaty into their do-
mestic law that punishes activities that are made illegal by the
convention."' At the very least, the United States wants to
provide absolute protection for its service members and keep
the issue at the governmental level.
0 5
CONCLUSION
The conflict regarding the viability of coalition operation
seems to have been averted by Canada's recent decision. Nev-
ertheless the issue of whether pre-positioned landmines can
stay put is still not settled. Although Norway's position on the
issue is not encouraging to U.S. military planners in Northern
Europe, U.S. landmines stored in the other territories should
be secured even though negotiations have not yet yielded an
answer. The U.S. military is the pre-eminent military force in
the world, a fact that U.S. allies rely heavily upon. Eliminating
landmines from the pre-positioned stockpiles denies the U.S.
military an essential military tool that it needs given current
limitations on technology and the shrinking of the U.S. mili-
tary in general.
Understandably the threat of a Russian attack through
NATO's Northern Flank is greatly diminished. Perhaps the
necessity of landmines in that region has seen its day, al-
though no one is completely certain that the former-Soviet
Union will not revert back to its old ways in the near future.
Yet U.S. pre-positioned stockpiles in Germany, Japan, Italy,
Spain and Diego Garcia are located close to areas where a
future conflict may occur. The conflict in Bosnia, while quieted
given NATO's presence there since 1994, may yet ignite and
expand into a regional war that would likely include the par-
ticipation of the United States. Japan's location is crucial
should a second war occur on the Korean Peninsula or if China
decides to exert its growing power over its neighbors. The need
for landmines to be close to the Middle East region is rather
obvious given the various tensions existing in the region. Just
recently Iraqi President Saddam Hussein denied access to
United Nation's weapons inspectors searching for chemical and
biological weapons resulting in a sustained bombardment by
104. Id.
105. See Staff Judge Advocate, supra note 99.
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U.S. and British forces. Removal of U.S. landmines from these
regions will only serve to weaken America's ability to defend
its interests abroad, interests that are often inextricably linked
to the interests of America's allies. Given the fact that U.S.
landmines self-destruct and/or deactivate, it makes no sense
for America's allies to think that eliminating the U.S. pre-posi-
tioned landmines from their territories will in any way allevi-
ate the world of the landmine problem. America's allies will
only be weakening their own defense against an enemy that
for now may be unknown, but is still a distinct possibility.
Instead of lambasting the United States for not signing
the Ottawa Treaty, proponents of a total ban of landmines
should support the U.S. efforts to conclude the Protocol II with
Russia, China, Iran, and Iraq, among others. By concluding
Protocol II, at the least the manufacture of mines that do not
self-destruct or deactivate can be eliminated by those countries
most responsible for their production.
Christian M. Capece
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